Is striking the only black prospective juror enough to show discrimination under Batson/Wheeler? See People v. Hazlett (2026)

On August 27, 2026, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Hazlett, a death penalty case with an important jury selection issue: what happens when the prosecutor uses his very first peremptory challenge to excuse the only black prospective juror left in the panel?
The facts:
The defendant here was on trial for first-degree murder, which also carried a phase for the death penalty if convicted.
The jury selection issue: Defendant, who is black, argued that the prosecutor violated Defendant’s constitutional rights “when [the prosecutor] used his first peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror A.E., the sole black remaining in the venire following the excusals of prospective jurors for hardship and cause.”
So, who was Prospective Juror A.E.? Per her questionnaire, a brother-in-law “went to jail” for “drugs”, and as to how those matters were handled answered: “They were handled fine.” She “indicated that she had no attitude, in general, about law enforcement.” She responded “no” to whether viewing graphic photographs of the victim and crime scene “would preclude [her] from objectively analyzing the evidence in this case.” And when asked whether the fact that the defendant was black and the victim was white would affect her ability to be fair, “A.E. indicated ‘No.’”
On the death penalty, her answers were a little mixed. She wrote that it is “used too often [and] everybody wants to get even with everyone.” But when asked whether the death penalty was used too often, seldom, randomly, or appropriately, she responded: “Too seldom. People are accused [and] then come to find out they were innocent [and] released.” (My author note: given her explanation, she likely meant “too often.”)
The trial court asked her about “the apparent contradiction”, and she replied: “Well, just like I stated, people are often given the death penalty and then later on found out they are not guilty because of the DNA results or — situation.”
Then the prosecutor’s questioning. He asked her: “having no reasonable doubt with regard to [defendant]’s guilt, if you thought it was an appropriate case, could you vote to sentence him to death?” She answered, “Probably not.” He followed up: “And the reason that you could not sentence him to death, even though you believed beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime, because you’d be frightened that he, nevertheless, might be innocent and the death penalty is final?” A.E. responded, “Yes.”
But by the end, A.E. said she would not take the easy way out. The prosecutor’s final question asked whether she might be someone who would say “I’m just going to take the easy way out and vote for life without parole, even though that’s not what I think the penalty should be. Is there any chance you might be such a person?” A.E. answered, “No, sir.” The prosecutor then passed on challenging her for cause.
After the hardship and cause excusals, “A.E. was one of 64 prospective jurors remaining in the venire, and the sole African-American prospective juror.” When the trial court asked the prosecutor to exercise his first peremptory challenge, “he excused A.E.”
“Defense counsel objected on Batson grounds.” The trial court mentioned that “[s]ome were excused” (other black prospective jurors) and asked the prosecutor whether he wanted to respond. “The prosecutor stated, ‘I do not.’” The trial court found no prima facie showing and denied the motion. Given this is a death sentence conviction, this appeal is automatic, but it still raises a very important issue on jury selection.
The law: Batson/Wheeler
First, a little background on this.
Batson/Wheeler comes from two cases: Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258. There’s a long history behind these cases, in California and across the country, so I won’t go deep into it here. But the core rule, per the Court:
“A prosecutor’s discriminatory peremptory challenge of a prospective juror based on their race or ethnicity violates a defendant’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution.”
And the stakes are high: “Exclusion of even one prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler constitutes structural error, requiring reversal.”
The three steps the Court walks through:
“A Batson/Wheeler objection triggers a three-step inquiry.”
First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”
Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.
Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.”
Here, Defendant Hazlett never got past step one. At that first step, the Court considers “all relevant circumstances”, and has identified certain evidence as “especially relevant,” including:
“whether a party has struck most or all of the members of the venire from an identified group, whether a party has used a disproportionate number of strikes against members of that group, whether the party has engaged those prospective jurors in only desultory voir dire, whether the defendant is a member of that group, and whether the victim is a member of the group to which a majority of remaining jurors belong.”
The Court’s analysis:
The Court’s holding up front: “Based on an independent review of the record, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the prosecution’s excusal of A.E. do not support an inference of discrimination.”
The strike itself: The prosecutor “used his first peremptory challenge, out of a total of four, to excuse the sole African-American prospective juror remaining on the venire”. But the Court found it “important here that defendant’s Batson/Wheeler argument is based on only one peremptory challenge.”
Let’s first address the timing…and whether that was an important factor to consider: “[T]he prosecutor used his first challenge on A.E. and then was prepared to accept the jury as constituted.” But the Court concluded “that the timing of this challenge carries only limited significance”, and that “it is not especially telling that the prosecutor used his first peremptory challenge on A.E., as opposed to waiting until later to exercise the challenge.” Why? “The prosecutor could have concluded early on, based on race-neutral reasons, that he did not want A.E. as a juror regardless of how the jury was otherwise composed.”
The questioning: The Court found that “any possible inference of discrimination here is undercut by the prosecutor’s thorough questioning of A.E.” Its direct statement: “This voir dire is not suggestive of a discriminatory intent.”
The race of the defendant and the victim: Next, the Court considered “whether the defendant is a member of” the same identifiable group as the excused prospective juror, and whether the victim is a member of the group to which a majority of the remaining jurors belong. Defendant and A.E. are black; the victim (and the victims of the uncharged sexual assaults) were Caucasian; and the jury was described as all-White. The Court agreed these facts are relevant. But: “And here, there is nothing beyond these facts, and the prosecutor’s exercise of his first peremptory challenge on A.E., to support defendant’s argument regarding an inference of discrimination. We conclude that is not enough.”
The obvious race-neutral reason: The Court then went back to A.E.’s answers on the death penalty, noting that “in her jury questionnaire A.E. stated both that the death penalty was used too often and too seldom, further explaining that ‘People are accused [and] then come to find out they were innocent [and] released.’”
And this is the key part of the Court’s analysis:
“It is apparent from the record that A.E.’s answers to questions regarding the death penalty constituted an ‘obvious’ basis for a peremptory challenge.”
As the Court explained, it has “repeatedly found that ‘[a] prospective juror’s reluctance to vote for a penalty verdict of death is a permissible, race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge.’”
A.E.’s statement that she wouldn’t automatically vote for life didn’t change things: “The fact that A.E. said she would not automatically vote in favor of life without the possibility of parole does not alter our analysis.”
The Court ties it all up with this:
“In sum, after independently examining the record and considering all relevant circumstances, we conclude the record does not support an inference that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror A.E. was based on racial discrimination.”
The dissent:
This was not a unanimous decision. “Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, and Fujisaki concurred.” But there were two dissents: “Justice Liu filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Evans concurred. Justice Evans filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Liu concurred.”
A 5–2 split on this issue shows how intense, and how important, these jury selection questions remain for all of us.




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